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ABSTRACT
We introduce the Universal Timed Concurrent Constraint
Programming (utcc) process calculus; a generalisation of
Timed Concurrent Constraint Programming. The utcc cal-
culus allows for the specification of mobile behaviours in the
sense of Milner’s π-calculus: Generation and communication
of private channels or links. We first endow utcc with an
operational semantics and then with a symbolic semantics
to deal with problematic operational aspects involving in-
finitely many substitutions and divergent internal computa-
tions. The novelty of the symbolic semantics is to use tempo-
ral constraints to represent finitely infinitely-many substitu-
tions. We also show that utcc has a strong connection with
Pnueli’s Temporal Logic. This connection can be used to
prove reachability properties of utcc processes. As a com-
pelling example, we use utcc to exhibit the secrecy flaw of
the Needham-Schroeder security protocol.
Keywords
Concurrent Constraint Programming, Symbolic Semantics,
Security, Mobility.
1. INTRODUCTION
Process calculi treat concurrent processes much like the
λ-calculus treat computable functions. They provide a lan-
guage in which the structure of terms represents the struc-
ture of processes together with an operational semantics to
represent computational steps. Concurrent Constraint Pro-
gramming (CCP) [13] is a process calculus which combines
the traditional operational view of process calculi with a
declarative one based upon logic. This combination allows
CCP to benefit from the large body of techniques of both
process calculi and logic. In fact, CCP has successfully been
used in the modelling of several concurrent scenarios: E.g.,
Biological, Timed, Reactive and Stochastic systems [10].
Agents in CCP interact with each other by telling and ask-
ing information represented as constraints in a global store.
The process tell(c) adds the constraint c to the store and the
ask process when c do P executes P if c is entailed by the
store. The process (localx; c) P declares a private variable
x for P constrained by c and P ‖ Q stands for the paral-
lel execution of P and Q. The computations of processes
are deterministic in that the final store is always the same
regardless of the execution order of parallel components.
Generation and communication of private links or chan-
nels, i.e. mobility, is fundamental for the specification of
systems where agents change their communication structure
(mobile systems). This is also fundamental to specify pro-
tocols where nonces (i.e, randomly-generated unguessable
items) are transmitted. In fact, generation and communica-
tion of private links are the central operations of one of the
main representative formalisms for mobility in concurrency
theory, namely the π-calculus [9].
We aim at defining a CCP-based language to specify mo-
bility. This language ought to comply with two criteria that
distinguish basic CCP from other formalisms: (1) Logic cor-
respondence which provides CCP with a unique declarative
view of processes and (2) determinism which is the source of
CCP’s elegant and simple characterisations (e.g., the closure
operator semantics [13]). Another general criterion for our
extension is (3) to be applicable to meaningful concurrent
scenarios, in particular those not yet explored using CCP
calculi.
Basic CCP is able to specify mobile behaviour using log-
ical variables to represent channels and unification to bind
messages to channels [13]. In this approach if two messages
are sent through the same channel, they must be equal. In
other case an inconsistency arises. In [6] this problem is
solved using Atomic CCP where tell(c) adds c to the cur-
rent store d if c ∧ d is not inconsistent. Here a protocol is
required since messages must compete for a position in a
list representing the messages previously sent. Atomic tells
introduce non-determinism to the calculus since the execu-
tion of tell(c) depends on the current store thus not adhering
to Criterion (2). Furthermore, to our knowledge no corre-
spondence between this language and logic has been given
(Criterion (1)).
Mobility can be also modelled by adding linear parametric
ask processes to CCP as done in Linear CCP [4]. A para-
metric ask A(x) can be viewed as a process when c do P
with a variable x declared as a formal parameter. Intuitively,
A(x) may evolve into P [y/x], i.e. P with x replaced by y,
if c[y/x] is entailed by the store. Mobility is exhibited when
y is a private variable (link) from some other process. This
extension, however, does not adhere to Criterion (2), i.e. it
is non-deterministic: If both c[y/x] and c[z/x] are entailed
by the store, A(x) may evolve to either P [y/x] or P [z/x].
The above kind of non-determinism can be avoided by ex-
tending CCP only with persistent parametric asks following
the semantics of the persistent π-calculus in [11]. The idea
is that if both c[y/x] and c[z/x] are entailed by the store, a
persistent A(x) evolves into A(x) ‖ P [y/x] ‖ P [z/x]. Forc-
ing every ask to be persistent, however, makes the extension
not suitable for modelling typical scenarios where a process
stops after performing its query (e.g., web-services requests).
Our strategy is therefore to extend CCP with temporary
parametric ask operations. Intuitively, these operations be-
have as persistent parametric asks during a time-interval but
may disappear afterwards. We do this by generalising the
timed CCP model in [12]. We call this extension Universal
Timed CCP (utcc). As explained below, we shall show that
utcc complies with previously-mentioned criteria (1-3).
Contributions. We first give utcc an operational se-
mantics. However, parametric ask operations pose technical
problems: They may generate infinitely many substitutions
thus causing divergent (i.e., infinite) internal computations.
We resolve this problem by endowing utcc with a novel sym-
bolic semantics that uses temporal constraints to represent
finitely a possible infinite number substitutions. We then
show that utcc allows for mobility and it is deterministic
(Criterion 2). We shall show a strong correspondence with
Linear-Time Temporal Logic (LTL) by providing a compo-
sitional encoding of utcc processes into LTL formulae (Cri-
terion 1). This correspondence with the standard logic for
the verification of concurrent systems allows for reachability
analysis central to security protocols: If there is a way to
reach a state where an intruder knows a secret, then there
is a secrecy breach. To illustrate the applicability of utcc
(Criterion 3), we use it to model and predict the secrecy flaw
in the well-known Needham-Schroeder Protocol [7].
To our knowledge this is the first symbolic semantics for a
CCP calculus as well as the first one in concurrency theory
using temporal constraints as finite representations of sub-
stitutions. Furthermore, we are not aware of any other work
applying a CCP calculus to model security protocols.
2. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we describe the temporal concurrent con-
straint (tcc) model [12] following the presentation in [10].
CCP calculi are parametric in a constraint system (cs). A
cs can be represented as a pair (Σ, ∆) where Σ is a signa-
ture of function and predicate symbols, and ∆ is a first-order
theory over Σ. Given a cs (Σ, ∆), let L be its underlying
first-order language with variables x, y, . . ., and logic sym-
bols ¬,∧,∨,⇒,⇔, ∃, ∀, true and false. Constraints c, d, . . .
are formulae over L. We say that c entails d in ∆, written
c ⊢∆ d, iff (c ⇒ d) ∈ ∆ (i.e., iff c ⇒ d is true in all models
of ∆). We shall omit ”∆” in ⊢∆ when no confusion arises.
For operational reasons ⊢ is often required to be decidable.
We use ~t for a sequence of terms t1, . . . , tn with length
|~t| = n. If |~t| = 0 then ~t is written as ǫ. We use c[~t/~x], where
|~t| = |~x| and xi’s are pairwise distinct, to denote c with the
free occurrences of xi replaced with ti. The substitution
[~t/~x] will be similarly applied to other syntactic entities.
The tcc calculus extends CCP for timed systems [12].
Time is conceptually divided into time intervals (or time
units). In a particular time interval, a CCP process P gets
an input c from the environment, it executes with this input
as the initial store, and when it reaches its resting point,
it outputs the resulting store d to the environment. The
resting point determines a residual process Q which is then
executed in the next time interval. The resulting store d is
not automatically transferred to the next time interval.
Definition 1. Processes P, Q, . . . in tcc are built from
constraints in the underlying cs by the following syntax:
P, Q := skip | tell(c) | when c do P | P ‖ Q |
(local ~x; c) P | next P | unless c next P | ! P
with the variables in ~x being pairwise distinct.
The process skip does nothing and tell(c) adds c to the store
in the current time interval. If in the current time interval
c can eventually be derived from the store, when c do P
evolves into P within the same time interval. Otherwise
when c do P evolves into skip. P ‖ Q denotes P and
Q running in parallel during the current time interval and
(local ~x; c) P binds ~x in P by declaring it private to P under
a constraint c. The bound variables bv(Q) (free variables
fv(Q)) are those with a bound (a not bound) occurrence in
Q. We write (local ~x) P as short for (local ~x; true) P.
The unit-delay nextP executes P in the next time inter-
val. The time-out unless c nextP is also an unit-delay, but
P is executed in the next time unit iff c is not entailed by the
final store at the current time interval. We use nextnP as
short for next . . .nextP , with next repeated n times. Fi-
nally, the replication ! P means P ‖ nextP ‖ next2P ‖ . . .,
i.e., unboundly many copies of P but one at a time.
3. UNIVERSAL TIMED CC
In [12] it is shown that tcc processes are finite-state. This
means it cannot be used to describe infinite-state behaviours
like those arising from mobility which is one of the main
concerns in this paper. Mobility is understood in the sense
of the π-calculus, i.e, communication of private variables
(or links). In this section we introduce an extension to tcc
which by following a logic approach it provides for mobile
behaviour. We call this extension Universal tcc (utcc).
3.1 Abstractions
To model mobile behaviour, utcc replaces the tcc ask
operation when c do P with a more general parametric
ask construction, namely (abs ~x; c) P . This process can be
viewed as a λ-abstraction of the process P on the variables
~x under the constraint (or with the guard) c. From a pro-
gramming language perspective, ~x in (local ~x; c) P can be
viewed as the local variables of P while ~x in (abs ~x; c) P
can be viewed as the formal parameters of P.
From a logic perspective we shall show that the new binder
has a pleasant duality with the local operator: The processes
(local ~x; c) P and (abs ~x; c) P correspond, resp., to the ex-
istential and universal formulae ∃~x(c∧FP ) and ∀~x(c ⇒ FP )
where FP corresponds to P .
Definition 2 (utcc Processes). The utcc processes
result from replacing in the syntax in Definition 1 the ex-
pression when c do P with (abs ~x; c) P with the variables
in ~x being pairwise distinct.
Intuitively, Q = (abs ~x; c) P performs P [~t/~x] in the cur-
rent time interval for all the terms ~t s.t c[~t/~x] is entailed by
the store. Q binds the variables ~x in P and c. Sets fv(.) and
bv(.), are extended accordingly. Furthermore Q evolves into
skip at the end of the time unit. We shall use when c do P
for the empty abstraction (abs ǫ; c) P.
Mobile links. We conclude this section with a little ex-
ample illustrating how mobility is obtained from the inter-
play between abstractions and local processes.
Example 1 (Mobility). Let Σ be a signature with the
unary predicates out1, out2, . . . and a constant 0. Let ∆ be
the set of axioms over Σ valid in first-order logic 1. Let
1Notice that the induced ⊢ is decidable because ∆ corre-
sponds to monadic first-order logic.
RT
〈tell(c), d〉 −→ 〈skip, d ∧ c〉
RP
〈P, c〉 −→
D
P ′, d
E
〈P ‖ Q, c〉 −→
D
P ′ ‖ Q, d
E
RL
〈P, c ∧ (∃~xd)〉 −→
D
P ′, c′ ∧ (∃~xd)
E
〈(local ~x; c) P, d〉 −→
D
(local ~x; c′) P ′, d ∧ ∃~xc′
E
RU
d ⊢ c
〈unless c next P, d〉 −→ 〈skip, d〉
RR
〈! P, d〉 −→ 〈P ||next ! P, d〉
RA
d ⊢ c[~t/~x] |~t| = |~x|
〈(abs ~x; c) P, d〉 −→
˙
P [~t/~x]||(abs ~x; c ∧ ~x 6= ~t ) P, d
¸
RS
γ1 −→ γ2
γ′1 −→ γ
′
2
if γ1 ≡ γ
′
1 and γ2 ≡ γ
′
2
RO
〈P, c〉 −→∗ 〈Q, d〉 6−→
P
(c,d)
====⇒ F (Q)
Table 1: Internal and observable reductions. ≡ and F
are given in Definitions 3 and 4. In RA, ~x 6= ~t denotes
W
1≤i≤|~x| xi 6= ti. If |~x| = 0, ~x 6= ~t is defined as false.
P = (abs y; out1(y)) tell(out2(y)) and Q =
(local z) (tell(out1(z)) ‖ when out2(z) do next tell(out2(0)))
Intuitively, if a link y is sent on channel out1, P forwards
it on out2 . Now, Q sends its private link z on out1 and if it
gets it back on out2 it outputs 0 on out2 . In the next section
we show that P ‖ Q produces out2(0) in the next time unit.
3.2 Operational Semantics (SOS)
The structural operational semantics (SOS) of utcc con-
siders transitions between process-store configurations 〈P, c〉
with stores represented as constraints and processes quo-
tiented by ≡. We use γ, γ′, . . . to range over configurations.
Definition 3. Let ≡ be the smallest congruence satisfy-
ing: (0) P ≡ Q if they differ only by a renaming of bound
variables (1) P ‖ skip ≡ P , (2) P ‖ Q ≡ Q ‖ P , (3)
P ‖ (Q ‖ R) ≡ (P ‖ Q) ‖ R, (4) P ‖ (local ~x; c) Q ≡
(local ~x; c) (P ‖ Q) if ~x 6∈ fv(P ), (5) (local ~x; c) skip ≡
skip. Extend ≡ by decreeing that 〈P, c〉 ≡ 〈Q, c〉 iff P ≡ Q.
The SOS transitions are given by the relations −→ and
=⇒ in Table 1. The internal transition 〈P, d〉 −→ 〈P ′, d′〉
should be read as “P with store d reduces, in one inter-
nal step, to P ′ with store d′ ”. The observable transition
P
(c,d)
====⇒ R should be read as “P on input c, reduces in one
time unit to R and outputs d”. The observable transitions
are obtained from finite sequences of internal transitions.
We only describe some of the rules in Table 1 due to space
restrictions. The other rules are standard, easily seen to
realise the operational intuitions given above (see [10] for
further details). As clarified below, the seemingly missing
rules for “next” and “unless” processes are given by RO.
We dwell a little upon the description of Rule RL as it
may seem somewhat complex. Consider Q = (localx; c) P
in Rule RL. The global store is d and the local store is c.
We distinguish between the external (corresponding to Q)
and the internal point of view (corresponding to P ). From
the internal point of view, the information about x, possibly
appearing in the “global” store d, cannot be observed. Thus,
before reducing P we first hide the information about x
that Q may have in d by existentially quantifying x in d.
Similarly, from the external point of view, the observable
information about x that the reduction of internal agent P
may produce (i.e., c′) cannot be observed. Thus we hide it
by existentially quantifying x in c′ before adding it to the
global store. Additionally, we make c′ the new private store
of the evolution of the internal process.
Rule RA describes the behaviour of (abs ~x; c) P . If the
store entails c[~t/~x] then P [~t/~x] is executed. Additionally,
the abstraction persists in the current time interval to allow
other potential replacements of ~x in P but c is augmented
with xi 6= ti to avoid executing P [~t/~x] again.
Rule RO says that an observable transition from P la-
belled with (c, d) is obtained from a terminating sequence
of internal transitions from 〈P, c〉 to a 〈Q, d〉. The process
R to be executed in the next time interval is equivalent to
F (Q) (the “future” of Q). F (Q) is obtained by removing
from Q abstractions and any local information which has
been stored in Q, and by “unfolding” the sub-terms within
“next” and “unless” expressions.
Definition 4. Let F be a partial function defined as:
F (skip) = skip F ((abs ~x; c) Q) = skip
F (P1 ‖ P2) = F (P1) ‖ F (P2) F ((local ~x; c) Q) = (local ~x) F (Q)
F (next Q) = Q F (unless c next Q) = Q
We can now illustrate the observable transition showing
the expected behaviour in our mobility example.
Example 2 (Mobile Observable Transition). Let P
and Q as in Example 1. One can verify that for every c :,
P ‖ Q
(c,d)
====⇒ R with R ≡ tell(out2(0)).
3.2.1 Infinite behaviour within time-units
Due to abstractions the SOS may induce an infinite se-
quence of internal transitions within a time interval thus
never producing an observable transition.
Abstraction Loops. One source of infinite internal be-
haviour involves looping (recursion) in abstractions. E.g.
let R = (abs x; out1(x)) (local z) tell(out1(z))). Each time
R gets a link on out1, it generates a new link z on out1
thus causing infinite internal behaviour. (A similar problem
involves several abstractions producing mutual recursive be-
haviour.) This kind of looping problems can be avoided by
requiring for each (abs x; c) P that P must be a “next”
expression. This restriction, however, may also disallow be-
haviour which will not cause infinite internal computations.
Infinitely Many Substitutions. Another source of infi-
nite internal behaviour involves the cs under consideration.
Let R = (abs x; c) P. If the current store d entails c[t/x]
for infinitely many t’s, then R will have to produce P [t/x]
for each such t. This kind of infinite internal behaviour
can be avoided by allowing only guards c so that for any
d the set {t | d ⊢ c[t/x]} modulo logic equivalence is fi-
nite. This seems inconvenient for the modelling of cryp-
tographic knowledge as typically is done in process calculi:
The presence of some messages entails the presence of arbi-
trary compositions among them. We discuss this at length
in our security application in Section 6.
4. SYMBOLIC SEMANTICS
In this section we define a symbolic semantics for utcc
whose basic idea is to use temporal constraints to represent
in a finite way a possibly infinite number of substitutions as
well as the information that an infinite loop may provide.
It turns out that without appealing to the syntactic restric-
tions mentioned above, this semantics guarantees that every
sequence of internal transitions is finite.
4.1 Symbolic Intuitions
Before defining the symbolic semantics let us give some
intuitions of its basic principles.
A. Substitutions as Constraints. Take R = (abs x; c) P.
The operational semantics performs P [t/x] for every t s.t
c[t/x] is entailed by the store d. Instead, the symbolic se-
mantics dictates that R should produce e = d ∧ ∀x(c ⇒ d′)
where, similarly, d′ should be produced according to the
symbolic semantics by P . Let t be an arbitrary term s.t
d ⊢ c[t/x]. The idea is that if e′ is operationally produced by
P [t/x] then e′ should be entailed by d′[t/x]. Since d ⊢ c[t/x]
then e ⊢ d′[t/x] ⊢ e′. Therefore e entails the constraint that
any arbitrary P [t/x] produces.
B. Timed Dependencies in Substitutions. The sym-
bolic semantics represents as temporal constraints depen-
dencies between substitutions from one time interval to an-
other. E.g., suppose that for R above, P = next tell(e).
Operationally, once we move to the next time unit, the con-
straints produced are of the form e[t/x] for those t’s s.t the fi-
nal store d in the previous time unit entails c[t/x]. The sym-
bolic semantics captures this as e′ = (⊖d) ∧ ∀x((⊖c) ⇒ e)
where ⊖ is the “previous” modality in temporal logic. Intu-
itively, ⊖c′ means that c′ holds in the previous time interval.
4.2 Temporal Formulae and Constraints
We shall use (a fragment of) the standard Linear-Time
Temporal Logic (LTL) in [8] for our symbolic semantics.
Definition 5. Given a cs with a first-order language L,
the LTL formulae we use are given by the syntax:
F, G, . . . := c | F ∧ G | ¬F | ∃xF | ⊖ F | ◦F | F.
where c is a constraint in L, from now called state formula.
The modalities ⊖F, ◦F and F state, resp., that F holds
previously, next and always. We use ∀xF for ¬∃x¬F , and
the eventual modality ✸F as an abbreviation of ¬¬F .
We presuppose the reader is familiar with the basic con-
cepts of Model Theory. The non-logical symbols of L are
given meaning in an underlying L-structure, or L-model,
M(L) = (I,D). (They are interpreted via I as relations
over a domain D of the corresponding arity.) A state s is
a mapping assigning to each variable x in L a value s[x] in
D. This interpretation is extended to L-expressions in the
usual way (e.g. s[f(x)] = I(f)(s[x])). We write s |=M(L) c
iff c is true wrt s in M(L). The state s is an x-variant of s′
iff s′[y] = s[y] for each y 6= x. We use σ to range over infinite
sequences of states. Furthermore, σ is an x-variant of σ′ iff
σ(i) is an x-variant of σ′(i) for each i ≥ 0.
Definition 6. We say that σ satisfies F in an L-structure
M(L), written σ |=M(L) F, iff 〈σ, 0〉 |=M(L) F where:
〈σ, i〉 |=M(L) true 〈σ, i〉 6|=M(L) false
〈σ, i〉 |=M(L) c iff σ(i) |=M(L) c
〈σ, i〉 |=M(L) ¬F iff 〈σ, i〉 6|=M(L) F
〈σ, i〉 |=M(L) F ∧ G iff 〈σ, i〉 |=M(L) F and 〈σ, i〉 |=M(L) G
〈σ, i〉 |=M(L) ⊖F iff i > 0 and 〈σ, i − 1〉 |=M(L) F
〈σ, i〉 |=M(L) ◦F iff 〈σ, i + 1〉 |=M(L) F
〈σ, i〉 |=M(L) F iff for all j ≥ i, 〈σ, j〉 |=M(L) F
〈σ, i〉 |=M(L) ∃xF iff for some x-variant σ
′of σ, 〈σ′, i〉 |=M(L) F
RAs
〈P, ∃~xd〉 −→s
D
P ′, d′ ∧ ∃~xd
E
〈(abs ~x; c) P, d〉 −→s
D
(abs ~x; c) P ′, d ∧ ∀~x(c ⇒ d′)
E
ROs
〈P, c〉 −→∗s 〈Q, d〉 6−→s
P
(c,d)
====⇒s Fs(Q, d)
Table 2: Symbolic Rules for Internal and Observable Tran-
sitions. The function Fs is given in Definition 7.
We say that F is LTL valid in M(L) iff for all σ, σ |=M(L) F.
LTL Theories. Given a cs (∆, Σ) with first-order lan-
guage L, the LTL theory induced by ∆, T (∆) is the set of
LTL sentences that are LTL valid in all the L-structures (or
L-models) of ∆. We write F ⊢T (∆) G iff (F ⇒ G) ∈ T (∆).
We omit “(∆)” in ⊢T (∆) when no confusion arises.
Future-free constraints. For the symbolic semantics
we take the liberty of assuming that the constraints in utcc
processes and configurations are replaced with certain LTL
formulae. Namely, future-free formulae: Those which do not
contain occurrences of  and ◦. So, for example a process-
store configuration of the form 〈(abs y; ⊖c) P, ⊖d〉 may ap-
pear in the transitions of the symbolic semantics. We shall
abuse the notation by assuming that, in the context of the
symbolic semantics, c, d, c′, d′, . . . range over future-free for-
mulae. In the context of the SOS, however, c, d, c′, d′, . . .
range over state formulae only.
Future-free formulae preserve the decidability of their un-
derlying cs.
Proposition 1. Let (∆, Σ) be a cs with decidable entail-
ment relation ⊢. Then given F, G the problem of whether
F ⊢T G is decidable if F, G are future-free LTL formulae.
4.3 Symbolic Reductions.
The internal and observable symbolic transitions −→s, =⇒s
are defined as in Table 1 with ⊢ replaced by ⊢T and with RA
and RO replaced, resp., by RAs and ROs in Table 2 (with
c, c′ and d′ representing future-free formulae rather than just
state-formulae).
The rule RAs represents with the temporal constraint
∀~x(c ⇒ d′) the substitutions that its operational counter-
part RA would induce as intuitively explained in Section
4.1(A). Notice that in the reduction of P the variables ~x in
d are hidden, via existential quantification, to avoid clashes
with those in P .
The function Fs in ROs is similar to its operational coun-
terpart F . However, Fs records the final global and local
stores as well as abstraction guards as past information. As
explained in Section 4.1(B) this past information is needed
in next time unit.
Definition 7. Let Fs a partial function from configura-
tions to processes defined by Fs(P,d)=tell(⊖d)‖F ′(P ) where:
F ′(skip) = skip F ′((abs ~x; c) P ) = (abs ~x; ⊖c) F ′(P )
F ′(P1||P2) = F
′(P1)||F
′(P2) F
′((local ~x; c) Q) = (local ~x; ⊖c) F ′(Q)
F ′(next Q) = Q F ′(unless c next Q) = Q
where c and d represent future-free formulae.
Finally, it is easy to verify that no infinite sequence γ1 −→s
γ2 −→s . . . can be generated by the symbolic semantics.
Thus we avoid the problems discussed in Section 3.2.1.
5. SEMANTIC RESULTS
We now look at the semantics results for utcc. First of
all, as the basic CCP, utcc is deterministic.
Theorem 1 (Determinism). For every P, c if P
(c,d)
====⇒
Q and P
(c,d′)
====⇒ Q′ then Q ≡ Q′ and ⊢ d ⇔ d′. Similarly
for the symbolic semantics, for every P, c if P
(c,d)
====⇒s Q
and P
(c,d′)
====⇒s Q
′ then Q ≡ Q′ and ⊢T d ⇔ d
′.
Operational Correspondence. The correspondence
between the two semantics is given below. It states that
the (untimed) constraints entailed by the outputs of any ar-
bitrary long sequence of observable reductions coincide with
those of the corresponding one in the symbolic semantics.
We say that P is abstracted-unless free iff it has no occur-
rences of processes of the form unless c nextQ under the
scope of an abstraction.
Theorem 2 (Semantic Correspondence). Let P be
an abstracted-unless free process. Suppose that P
(c1,d1)
====⇒
P1
(c2,d2)
====⇒ P2 . . . and P
(c1,d1
′)
====⇒s P1
′ (c2,d2
′)
====⇒s P2
′ . . . .
Then for every state formula d and i > 0, di ⊢ d iff d
′
i ⊢T d.
We confined ourselves to abstracted-unless free processes
due to the problem of representing the negation of entail-
ment as logic formulae. Take P = (abs x; true) Q where
Q = unless e next tell(e′). Let d be the final store in the
first time unit when running P . Operationally, tell(e′)[t/x]
is executed in the second time unit for those t’s s.t d 6⊢ e[t/x].
Following Section 4.1 one may try to capture this in the
symbolic semantics with ⊖d ∧ ∀x(⊖(¬e) ⇒ e′) as if we had
Q = when ¬e do next tell(e′). This wrongly assumes, how-
ever, that in general d 6⊢ e[t/x] is equivalent to d ⊢ ¬e[t/x].
Nevertheless, abstract-unless free processes represent a
meaningful and practical fragment of utcc. They are suf-
ficient to express all the examples and intended applications
of this paper. In fact, one can show they are sufficient to
model Turing Machines which bears witness to their univer-
sal expressiveness. Due to space restrictions, however, this
is outside of the scope of this paper.
LTL Correspondence. The compositional encoding in
Definition 8 gives a pleasant correspondence between utcc
processes and LTL formulae. It shows the duality between
local and abstraction operators, represented resp. as exis-
tential and universal quantified formulae.
Definition 8. Let [[·]] a map from utcc processes to LTL
formulae given by:
[[skip]] = true [[tell(c)]] = c
[[(abs ~y; c) P ]] = ∀~y(c ⇒ [[P ]]) [[P ‖ Q]] = [[P ]] ∧ [[Q]]
[[(local ~x; c) P ]] = ∃~x(c ∧ [[P ]]) [[next P ]] = ◦[[P ]]
[[unless c next P ]] = c ∨ ◦[[P ]] [[! P ]] = ✷[[P ]]
Notation 1. Suppose that P1
(true,c1)
====⇒ s P2
(true,c2)
====⇒ s . . . ,
and c is a state formula. Let P = P1. We say that P even-
tually outputs c, written P ⇓c, iff for some i > 0, ci ⊢T c.
Theorem 3 (Logic Correspondence). Let [[·]] as in
Definition 8. If P is abstracted-unless free and c is a state
formula then [[P ]] ⊢T ✸c iff P ⇓
c.
A key aspect of Theorem 3 is that it allows using well-
established techniques from LTL for reachability analysis of
utcc processes: E.g., to verify if a given security protocol
modelled in utcc can reach a state where secrecy is violated.
A → B : {m, A}B
B → A : {m, n}A
A → B : {n}B
A → C : {m, A}C
C → B : {m, A}B
B → A : {m, n}A
A → C : {n}C
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Needham-Schroeder Protocol
PRJ
F ⊢s out({m1, m2}) i ∈ {1, 2}
F ⊢s out(mi)
PAIR
F ⊢s out(m1) F ⊢s out(m2)
F ⊢s out({m1, m2})
ENC
F ⊢s out(m) F ⊢s out(k)
F ⊢s out({m}k)
DEC
F ⊢s out(k
−1) F ⊢s out({m}k)
F ⊢s out(m)
Table 3: Security cs entailment relation.
6. APPLICATIONS
This section illustrates the use of utcc in the analysis of
security protocols. In particular, we shall exhibit the secrecy
flaw of the Needham-Schroeder protocol (NS) [7].
NS aims at distributing two nonces (unguessable secrets) in
a secure way. Figure 1(a) shows the steps of NS where m and
n represent the nonces generated, resp., by the principals A
and B. The notation {m, A}B represents the message ob-
tained by encrypting with B’s public key the composition m
with A’s identifier. In [7] it is shown how an attacker (C in
Figure 1(b)) can reveal n thus violating the secrecy property.
Modelling NS in utcc. As typically done we follow the
Dolev and Yao thread model [5] which presupposes an at-
tacker that can eavesdrop, disassemble, compose, encrypt
and decrypt messages with available keys. It also presup-
poses that cryptography is unbreakable. We begin by defin-
ing a cs based on [5] which follows the Dolev and Yao model.
Definition 9. Let Σs be a signature with constant sym-
bols in P ∪K∪{fail}, function symbols enc, pair, inv and
keyp and unary predicates out, secret, out
′. Let ∆s be the
closure under deduction of { F | ⊢s F } with ⊢s as in Table
3. The (secure) cs is the pair (Σs, ∆s).
Intuitively, P and K represent the principal identifiers A, B, . . .
and keys k, k′, . . .. We use {m}k, {m1, m2}, k
−1, resp.,
for enc(m, k) (encryption), pair(m1, m2)(composition) and
inv(k) (inverse key). Furthermore, keyp(x) represents the
public key of x. From [5] one can show that ⊢s is decidable.
The rule ENC says that if one can infer that the message
m as well as a key k are output on the global channel out,
then one may as well infer that {m}k is also output on out.
The other rules can be explained similarly.
We now specify the principals. First we need a process
W = (wait ~x; c) do P which waits, possibly for several time
units, until for some t, c[~t/~x] holds and then it executes
P [~t/~x]. Given stop, go /∈ fv(P ), W is defined as:
(local stop, go) (tell(out′(go)) ‖!unless out′(stop) next tell(out′(go))
‖! (abs ~x; c ∧ out′(go)) (P ‖! tell(out′(stop)))
The NS model uses Init and Resp describing the role of
the initiator and the responder i.e. A and B in Figure 1(a).
Posting messages, nonce generation, message reception are
modelled, resp., using tell, local and wait processes.
Init(i, r)
def
= (local m) tell(out({m, i}keyp(r))) ‖
(wait x; out({m, x}keyp(i))) do
next tell(out({x}keyp(r)))
Resp(t)
def
= (local n)next (wait y, p; out({y, p}keyp(t))) do
next tell(out({y, n}keyp(p)))
‖! tell(secret(n))
Notice that since Responder’s nonce cannot be known by
an attacker, Resp(t) states that n is secret.
We also define an observer O telling fail whenever a
secret appears unprotected on the global channel out . Ad-
ditionally the observer remembers every message that was
ever on out by transferring them across the time intervals.
O
def
= !(abs n; secret(n) ∧ out(n)) tell(fail) ‖
!(abs m; out(m))next tell(out(m))
The situation in Figure 1(b) can be modelled as:
NS = Init(A, C) ‖ Resp(B) ‖ O ‖ tell(cinit )
with cinit = out(keyp(C)
−1) ∧ ∀id∈P(out(id) ∧ out(keyp(id)))
representing the initial knowledge available for an attacker.
Namely, all the principal ids, their public keys and the com-
promised private key of C.
We can use the symbolic semantics to show that NS even-
tually outputs fail :
Proposition 2. NS ⇓fail.
Alternatively, the above proposition can be proved using
Theorem 3 and LTL deduction.
Notice that we cannot use the SOS to exhibit an out-
put of fail since the secure cs will generate infinite sub-
stitutions within a time interval (see Section 3.2.1). E.g., If
F ⊢ out(m) then F ⊢ out({m, m}) and F ⊢ out({m, m, m})
and so on. This illustrates the relevance of the symbolic se-
mantics and the correspondence in Theorem 3.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
From a practical point of view, we have implemented in
Oz (http://www.mozart-oz.org/) a prototype of an inter-
preter executing programs written in utcc. Following the
SOS, the interpreter computes the final stores given the in-
put sequences and the process to be executed. To avoid
problems with infinitely many substitutions, we restricted
m, m1 and m2 in Rules ENC and PAIR to have less than
a fixed number of applications of enc and pair . In this way
we have automatically verified Proposition 2.
Related Work In [2] and [5] a symbolic semantics is in-
troduced to deal with the infinite-branching reduction rela-
tion of variants of the spi-calculus caused by infinitely many
substitutions. Roughly, boolean constraints over names rep-
resent conditions the transition must hold to take place.
These calculi, however, are conceptually different from CCP.
Furthermore, here not only did the symbolic semantics deal
with the infinite-branching problem but also with temporal
issues and divergent internal computation in the SOS.
The language LMNtal [14] uses logical variables to spec-
ify mobility behaviour as basic CCP does. Since LMNtal
was designed as a unifying model of concurrency, it is non-
determinisitc thus not adhering to Criterion (2). Further-
more, to our knowledge no correspondence between this lan-
guages and logic has been given (Criterion (1)).
Several process calculi have been specifically designed for
the analysis of security protocols, e.g., [5, 2, 3]. Although
utcc can be used to reason about certain aspects of security
protocols (e.g., secrecy), it was not designed exclusively for
this domain of application. Nevertheless, its LTL character-
isation offers a reasoning technique for reachability, to our
knowledge not provided by the above calculi.
The rather successful logic programming approach to se-
curity protocols in [1] is closely related to ours in utcc. The
basic difference is that the underlying logic in [1] is Horn
clauses while ours is LTL. Also our approach benefits from
the operational view of process calculi.
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